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I. INTRODUCTION: THE NEW NEW TECHNOLOGY

By design, the law is reactive. Development of the law is driven by
developments in technology, particularly by those which are publicly
perceived as breakthrough developments. For example, the announcement
of the successful cloning of a sheep from a mature somatic cell prompted
calls for new legislation and reexamination of existing laws governing
everything from the funding of biomedical research to the definition of
human life. The realization that the Internet is transforming
communications has likewise prompted new legislation and reexamination
of existing laws governing everything from fundamental concepts of
presence and jurisdiction to personal privacy.
Considerable recent attention has been devoted to United States patent
law, in part because of interest in global harmonization of intellectual
property laws, and in part because of the growth of the intellectual
economy and the concomitant increase in interest in the methods of
protecting intellectual property. It has gone unnoticed, however, that a
fundamental principle of United States patent law-the refusal to grant
patents on inventions which have entered the public domain-needs
reexamination in light of the Internet's rapid development. The Manual of
Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP),l the United States Patent Office's
guidance document for the examination of patent applications, is silent on
the use of Internet materials as "printed publications" (a major category of
documents which help defme the public domain) in deciding patentability.
There appears to be no published analysis of whether the Internet is a
medium of "printed publications" either in the general literature or in the
United States Patent Office's policy documents. A moment's consideration
of the amount of information on the Internet, compared to the amount of
information in books and magazines, and a second moment's conjecture
as to the relative amounts of information in these media in the future,
should make clear the importance of such an analysis. In 1980, a researcher
looking for public information would have relied principally on books and
magazines in a library; in 2002, the researcher will rely principally on

1. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE (6th ed. rev. 3 1997).
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electronic sources, including Internet Web pages, news group archives,
online databases, and whatever new resources the next three years bring.
For those who are late to the revolution, an excellent (if already
outdated) introduction to the capabilities of the Internet is given in Justice
Stevens' opinion in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union: 2
The Internet is an international network of interconnected
computers ....
The Internet has experienced "extraordinary growth." The
number of "host" computers ... increased from about 300 in
1981 to approximately 9,400,000 by the time of the trial in
1996. . .. About 40 million people used the Internet at the
time of trial, a number that is expected to mushroom to 200
million by 1999.
Individuals can obtain access to the Internet from many
different sources .... Most colleges and universities provide
access for their students and faculty; many corporations
provide their employees with access through an office
network; many communities and local libraries provide free
access; and an increasing number of storefront "computer
coffee shops" provide access for a small hourly fee. Several
major national "online services" such as America Online,
CompuServe, the Microsoft Network, and Prodigy offer
access to their own extensive proprietary networks as well as
a link to the much larger resources of the Internet. These
commercial online services had almost 12 million individual
subscribers at the time of trial.
Anyone with access to the Internet may take advantage of
a wide variety of communication and information retrieval
methods. These methods are constantly evolving.... All of
these methods can be used to transmit text; most can transmit
sound, pictures, and moving video images. Taken together,
these tools constitute a unique medium-known to its users
as "cyberspace"-located in no particular geographical
location but available to anyone, anywhere in the world, with
access to the Internet.
E-mail enables an individual to send an electronic message
... to another individual or to a group of addressees.... A
mail exploder is a sort of e-mail group. Subscribers can send
messages to a common e-mail address, which then forwards
the message to the group's other subscribers. Newsgroups
also serve groups of regular participants, but these postings
may be read by others as well. There are thousands of such

2. 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997) (striking down the first federal legislative response to' the
Internet).
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groups.... About 100,000 new messages are posted every
day. In most newsgroups, postings are automatically purged
at regular intervals.... [T]wo or more individuals wishing to
communicate more immediately can enter a chat room to
engage in real-time dialogue-in other words, by typing
messages to one another that appear almost immediately on
the others' computer screens. The District Court found that at
any given time "tens of thousands of users are engaging in
conversations on a huge range of subjects." ...
The best known category of communication over the
Internet is the World Wide Web, which allows users to search
for and retrieve information stored in remote computers ....
In concrete terms, the Web consists of a vast number of
documents stored in different computers allover the world.
Some of these documents are simply files containing
information. However, more elaborate documents, commonly
known as Web "pages," are also prevalent. Each has its own
address-"rather like a telephone number." . . . They
generally also contain "links" to other documents created by
that site's author or to other (generally) related sites....
Navigating the Web is relatively straightforward. A user
may either type the address of a known page or enter one or
more keywords into a commercial "search engine" in an effort
to locate sites on a subject of interest. A particular Web page
may contain the information sought by the "surfer," or,
through its links, it may be an avenue to other documents
located anywhere on the Internet. ... Access to most Web
pages is freely available, but some allow access only to those
who have purchased the right from a commercial provider.
The Web is thus comparable, from the readers' viewpoint, to
both a vast library including millions of readily available and
indexed publications and a sprawling mall offering goods and
services.
From the publishers' point of view, it constitutes a vast
platform from which to address and hear from a world-wide
audience of millions of readers, viewers, researchers, and
buyers. Any person or organization with a computer
connected to the Internet can "publish" information. . . .
Publishers may either make their material available to the
entire pool of Internet users, or confine access to a selected
group, such as those willing to pay for the privilege. "No
single organization controls any membership in the Web, nor
is there any centralized point from which individual Web sites
or services can be blocked from the Web.,,3

3. Id. at 2334-36 (footnotes omitted).

[Vol. 51
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Justice Stevens has described the Internet, in a non-patent context, as
"a vast library including millions of readily available and indexed
publications.'04 In the patent context, however, current caselaw would
exclude this vast library from the definition of "printed publications" since
the Internet, as currently structured, does not meet the court-imposed
requirements that a "printed publication" be accessible and indexed. Thus,
the principal research tool of the next decade would not, as currently
constituted, be considered part of the public domain for purposes of
limiting claims to patentability.
Understanding this counterintuitive result begins with article I, section
8, clause 8 of the United States Constitution, which empowers Congress
"[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries."s This power is implemented by 35
U.S.C. § 101, which provides: "Whoeverinvents or discovers any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject
to the conditions and requirements of this title.',6
United States patent policy rewards inventors with a patent in exchange
for providing the public with information which was not previously
available to it.7 This underlying policy is implemented by the novelty
requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 1028 and the non-obviousness requirements
of 35 U.S.C. § 103.9 Taken together, these sections bar patentability of
4. Id. at 2335.
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cI. 8.
6. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
7. See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933). See generally
In re Bayer, 568 F.2d 1357, 1359-60 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (discussing why patents are not granted for
publicly available infonnation).
8. 35 U.S.C. § 102 provides:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the
invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or
a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one
year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States••••
35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
9. 35 U.S.C. § 103 provides:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed
or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to
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inventions, knowledge of which is already in the public domain, or which
are obvious in light of knowledge already in the public domain. lo
A principal source of evidence of what is in the public domain is
"printed pUblications," also referred to as "references." Section 102(a) bars
patentability if the invention was described in a printed publication prior
to the applicant's date of invention; section 102(b) bars patentability if the
invention was described in a printed pUblication more than one year prior
to the applicant's filing a patent application. ll A claimed invention which
is barred by section 102(a) is referred to as "anticipated" by the section
102(a) reference. "An anticipating reference must bear within its four
comers adequate directions for the practice of the invention."12
Congress' choice of the seemingly redundant phrase "printed
publication" has troubled courts and led to inconsistent resolutions of the
twin questions: "when is a publication printed?" and "when is a printing
published?" Although the law on the issue has been described as "a
muddled mess,,,13 two main interpretations have emerged: the statutory
standard requires "publication," and "printed" is therefore surplusage; and
the statutory standard requires "printing" as well as "publication." Modem

a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994).
10. Throughout this Article, "public domain" refers to information about an invention;
whether the invention itself is in the public domain depends on whether it was patented and, if so,
whether the patent has expired.
11. See itl. § 102. The publication must be sufficiently detailed to enable others to practice
the invention. Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 814 F.2d 628, 631-32 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The
date which would bar patentability (i.e., the day prior to the date of invention, or the day one year
and one day prior to filing the patent application) is known as the "critical date"; the time period
(i.e., one year) is referred to as the "grace period." The grace period has been varied, and differs
depending on the type of patent being sought. All of the cases cited herein deal with "utility
patents." Most countries other than the United States follow a rule of "absolute novelty" and do not
provide a grace period.
12. General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 349 F. Supp. 345, 356 (N.D.
Ohio 1972)(citing Dewey & Almy Chern. Co. v. Mimex Co., 124 F.2d 986, 989-90 (2d Cir. 1942);
Lincoln Stores, Inc. v.NashuaMfg.Co., 157F.2d 154, 159-60 (lstCir. 1946); Gordon Form Lathe
Co. v. Walcott Mach. Co., 32 F.2d 55, 58 (6th Cir. 1929); Morgan Const. Co. v.
WeIlman-Seaver-Morgan Co., 18 F.2d 395, 399 (6th Cir. 1927); and Munising Paper Co. v.
American Sulphite Pulp Co., 228 F. 700, 703-04 (6th Cir. 1915».
13. Wesley Kobylak, Annotation, Meaning ofTenn "Printed Publication" Under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(a) and (b), Denying Patentability to Invention Described in Printed Publication Before
Invention by Applicant or More than One Year Prior to Date ofPatent Application, 70 A.L.R. FED.
796, 803 (1984); see also I.C.E. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 250 F. Supp. 738,741 (S.D.N.Y.
1966) (stating that courts have failed to enunciate a uniform standard of what constitutes a
"publication" and of what is "printed"). A more sympathetic interpretation is offered in In re Hall:
"The § 102 pUblication bar is a legal determination based on underlying fact issues, and therefore
must be approached on a case-by-case basis." In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 899 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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cases have tended to focus on "publication," in the sense that the document
in question is available to a significant segment of the public, with little
regard for the document's form of dissemination (although all cases to date
have involved information in some tangible form).14
The development of the Internet requires a reexamination of the old
questions in a new context: is information which has been posted15 to a
Web page or other public forum on the Internet a "printed publication"
under section 102? Including Internet postings as "printed publications"
would greatly expand the amount of information which must be analyzed
in order to determine patentability of inventions. Excluding Internet
postings would, in the near future, likely exclude a significant portion of
cutting edge technological information from the public domain. This
Article will demonstrate that, under the current state of the caselaw and
given the current structure of the Internet, information posted to the
Internet cannot be considered a "printed publication.,,16 It will then propose
changes which might be made in the patent statute or in the Internet itself
in order for Internet postings to qualify as "printed publications."

14. See Kobylak, supra note 13, at 86 (Supp. 1997) (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Amoco
Chemicals Corp., 779 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Del. 1991); Gerald Rose, Do you have a "Printed
Publication?" If Not, Do You Have Evidence of Prior "Knowledge or Use?", 61 J. PAT. OFF.
SOC'y 643,650-51 (1979».
15. The term "posting" is used herein to mean placing information on a computer which is
accessible to the public (although not necessarily. the entire public) via the Internet and would
include the current technologies of electronic mailing to a newsgroup or usenet, or a hypertext link
from a World Wide Web page.
16. It is important to point out issues which are not posed by Internet posting: there is no
reason to suggest that posting removes anything from the public domain. Three cases must be
considered.
In the first case, an original document satisfies the definition of printed publication because it
has been printed and widely disseminated, for example, a journal article. A copy of the document
is posted on the Internet. Clearly, the posting does nothing to withdraw the original from the public
domain, and the original document remains a printed publication-it is irrelevant whether the
Internet posting is a printed publication or not.
In the second case, an original document satisfies the definition of printed publication because
it is printed and a copy is publicly available, properly indexed, and accessible to the interested
public. Posting a copy of the index would, again, not remove anything from the public domain and
the posted index is irrelevant.
In the third caSe, an original document is publicly available only because of a copy having been
posted on the Internet. This is the case of interC$t. While this article reviews the status of such a
posting as a printed publication under the "printed publication" section of 35 U.S.C. § 102, it does
not reach the question of whether such a posting might be evidence of public use or knowledge and
thereby defeat patentability under the "public use or knowledge" section of 35 U.S.C. § 102. This
presents different issues of proof and raises other issues beyond the scope of this article.

236

FWRlDA LAW REVIEW

[VoJ.S!

IT. CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
An inventor has two options for profiting from an invention: keep the
invention confidential, thus relying on trade secret protection,17 or protect
the invention under patent law. 1s Thomas Jefferson, the father of the
United States patent system,19 noted:

If nature has made anyone thing less susceptible than all
others of exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking
power called an idea, which an individual may exclusively
possess as long as he keeps it to himself; but the moment it is
divulged, it forces itself into the possession of everyone ....20
The choice to share an invention with the public irrevocably surrenders the
control which the inventor possessed. Thus, the Constitution instructs, an
incentive must be provided to encourage inventors to share ideas with a
world that would otherwise have, at best, the product of the invention for

17. Trade secret protection arises under common law, but has been codified by statute based
on the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) in 34 states and the District of Columbia. See UNIF.
TRADE SECRETS Acr, 14 U.L.A. 433 (1990). Certain misappropriations of trade secrets are also
prohibited by federal criminal law, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-2315, and the Economic Espionage Act
of 1996, see 18 U .S.C. §§ 1831-1839. The general requirements for trade secret protection are the
possession of confidential information which confers an economic benefit on those with knowledge
ofsuch information, plus reasonable steps to mai,ntain its confidentiality. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS
Acr § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. at 438. Trade secret protection prevents misappropriation-hroadly,
obtaining the information by improper means. See id. § 1(2). Trade secret protection may therefore
be lost if the information becomes known to others through independent development or other
proper means. Most states recognize reverse engineering of a publicly sold product as proper
means. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974). Unless such an event
occurs, however, a trade secret may be maintained indefinitely.
18. In order to obtain a patent, the inventor must file an application with the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). See 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1994). The application is examined by
the PTO and, if the application meets statutory requirements (including the requirements of novelty
under 35 U.S.C. § 102 and non-obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103), a patent is issued. See id. §
131. The inventor has no patent rights until the patent is issued. See id. § 154(a)(2). Patent
applications are, by law, confidential and, therefore, it is possible to maintain trade secret rights
while a patent is pending. See id. § 122. Of course, once a patent issues, it is public and therefore
information contained in the application can no longer be maintained as a trade secret.
19. Jefferson is characterized in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1,7 (1966), as the
"moving spirit" of the patent statute and the author of the 1793 Act.
20. THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1913), in THE PORTABLE
THOMAS JEFFERSON 525, 530 (Merrill D. Peterson, ed. 1975). Jefferson further observed: "Its
peculiar character, too, is that no one possesses the less, because every other possesses the whole
of it. He who receives an idea from me, receives instructions himself without lessening mine; as he
who lights his taper at mine receives light without darkening me." Id. This observation was clearly
a lapse of economic judgment for the sake of rhetoric. The basis of trade secret law is that there is
economic value in keeping competitors in the dark.
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as long as the inventor chose to share it, and no 10nger.21
The Constitution does not specify the incentive.22 It is clear, however,
that no incentive is necessary if the public is already in possession of the
underlying inventive idea. Hence section 102 denies patentability to ideas
which were "public" (to choose a word that does not prejudge the issue)
either before their supposed invention by the patent applicanf3 or
sufficiently long before the applicant chose to apply for a patent.24 Most
countries apply an absolute novelty standard which, except in limited
circumstances, precludes patentability for an invention disclosed, even by
the inventor, prior to fIling a patent application.2S United States law
provides a grace period for an inventor to file a patent application after
having made the invention public.26 It was early held that minor deviations
from public domain material would not support patentability.27 This
judicial gloss was codified as 35 U.S.C. § 103 which denies patentability
to ideas which are "obvious" advances over what is already "public.,,28
Thus, the question of when an idea is already "public" is central to the
issue of patentability. Congress has experimented with this fundamental
issue. The following Part discusses the various attempts by Congress to
answer this important question.

21. Some inventions lend themselves more easily to commercialization coupled with trade
secrecy than others. Inventions which may be used under the sole control of the inventor (for
example a machine which produces, but is not itself, a consumer product) can be commercialized
without disclosing their secrets. Inventions which must be placed in the hands of third parties (for
example, consumer products) pose greater risks ofdisclosure, for example, by reverse engineering.
22. In fact, Congress has from time to time altered the incentive, and has provided different
incentives for different types of inventions and discoveries. Most recently, it changed the term of
United States Patents from 17 years from date of issue to 20 years from date of application. See 35
U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1998). Design patents last for 14 years. See 35 U.S.C. § 173 (1994).
23. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
24. See id. § 102(b). Note that the two subclauses of section 102 have different purposes.
Section 102(a) reinforces the section 101 principle that only the inventor is entitled to a patent: if
there were a printed publication describing the invention before the claimed date of invention, then
the applicant is not the original inventor. On the other hand, section 102(b) can bar even the
original inventor from obtaining a patent The purpose of section 102(b) is to discourage inventors
from delaying filing an application (thereby delaying, if not destroying, the public benefit of the
disclosure of the invention) or from filing a patent application only after efforts to preserve a trade
secret have failed.
25. See DONAlD S. CHISUM & MICHAEL A. JACOBS, UNDERSTANDING INTEUECI'UAL
PROPERTY LAW 2-97 (1997); DONAlD A. GREGORY ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO INTEUECI'UAL
PROPERTY LAW 38-39 (1994).
26. The grace period with respect to printed publications for public use or sale is currently
one year. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994). Under the 1836 statute, as amended in 1839, the grace
period was two years. There is no grace period in countries which follow the rule of absolute
novelty.
27. See Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 261 (1850).
28. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994).
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Ill. STATUTORY DEVELOPMENT OF THE
PuBLIC DOMAIN CONCEPT

The patent statute divides the patentable from the unpatentable along
several lines: inventorship, patentable subject matter, and prior state of the
art. Only inventors may apply for patents.29 Only subject matter permitted
by statute may be patented.30 Only inventions, knowledge of which is not
already in the public domain, may be patented.3!
Although the statute has been through several major incarnations, from
the beginning it has prohibited granting patents which would withdraw
technology from the public domain. However, the requirement that a patent
be denied if the invention was described in a prior printed publication did
not explicitly enter the patent statute until its third enactment, in 1836.32

A. The 1790 Statute
The original patent statute,33 enacted in 1790, provided for patenting of
"any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any
improvement therein not before known or used.,,34It also created a board

29.
30.
31.
32.

See id. § 101.
See id.
See id. § 102.
See infra text accompanying notes 41-47,

33. Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7,1 Stat. 109 (l790)(repealed 1793), Section 1 of the statute
provided:
That upon the petition of any person or persons to the Secretary of State, the
Secretary for the department of war, and the Attorney General of the United
States, setting forth, that he, she, or they, hath or have invented or discovered any
useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein
not before known or used, and praying that a patent may be granted therefor, it
shall and may be lawful to and for the said Secretary of State, the Secretary for the
department of war, and the Attorney General, or any two of them, if they shall
deem the invention or discovery sufficiently useful and important, to cause letters
patent to be made out in the name of the United States, to bear [tests] by the
President of the United States, reciting the allegations and suggestions of the said
petition, and describing the said invention or discovery, clearly, truly and fully,
and thereupon granting to such petitioner or petitioners, his, her or their heirs,
administrators or assigns for any term not exceeding fourteen years, the sole and
exclusive right and liberty of making, constructing, using and vending to others
to be used, the said invention or discovery, , , •

Id. § 1,1 Stat. 109-10.
34. ld. Presumably, the "not before known" standard would have precluded patenting an
invention which would fail the current section 102(b) bar, although it is not clear what time frame
the ''before'' refers to (the date of invention or the date of application). If it refers to the date of th~
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composed of the Secretary of State (then Thomas Jefferson), the Secretary
of War (then Henry Knox), and the Attorney General (then Edmund
Randolph), empowered to issue a patent "if they shall deem the invention
or discovery sufficiently useful and important.,,35 No power of review was
provided,36 and presumably these three cabinet members took time from
their regular duties to review each application.37

B. The 1793 Statute
The second patent statute,38 enacted in 1793, provided that
when any person ... being a citizen ... of the United States,
shall allege that he ... [has] invented any new and useful art,
machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement of any art, machine, manufacture or
composition of matter, not known or used before the
application, and shall present a petition to the Secretary of
State, ... it shall and may be lawful for the said Secretary of
State, to cause letters patent to be made out ....39
Thus, in effect, under the 1793 statute, a patent was granted to any U.S.
citizen who paid the application fee. If multiple parties claimed the same
invention, a' three person board was appointed (one member by the
Secretary of State, and one member by each of the claimants) to decide
entitlement to the patent.40

C. The 1836 and 1870 Statutes
Senator John Ruggles of Maine perceived the flaw of what was, in
effect, a registration system (as opposed to an examination system) and
chaired the Congressional committee which reviewed and revised the

application, then it is a more stringent standard than that imposed by current section 102(b), but
conforms to the norm of patent statutes outside the United States. See supra note 25. In that case,
"by others" must be implied, since by definition the inventor knew of the invention before filing
the application (although not before the date of invention).
35. 1 Stat. at 110.
36. Perhaps no review power was provided in despair of finding a tribunal willing to secondguess Jefferson, Knox, and Randolph.
37. In the three years of operation under the 1790 statute, 55 patents were issued. See U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE STORY OF THE U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE 2 (1988).
38. Act of Feb. 21,1793, ch. II, 1 Stat. 318 (repealed 1836).
39. [d. § I, 1 Stat. at 318-20. The language limits patents to invention not known or used
before filing of the application. This must have been intended to mean "not known or used by
others" since clearly the inventor knew of the invention before filing the application.
40. See id. § 9, 1 Stat. at 322-23. In the case of more than two claimants, either the parties
mutually agreed on the arbitrators or the Secretary of State appointed all three. See id. 1 Stat. at 323.
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patent statute in 1836. The Ruggles committee report noted that, under the
1793 system, patents were issued "without any examination into the merit
or novelty of the invention," "[many] patents ... are worthless and void,
as conflicting with, and infringing upon one another, or upon, public rights
not subject to patent privilege; arising either from a want of due attention
to the specifications of claim, or from the ignorance of the patentees of the
state of the arts ... ," and "a great number of lawsuits arise, which are
daily increasing in an alarming degree, onerous to the courts, ruinous to the
parties, and injurious to society," and concluded that patents, and thus the
then-current patent system, were of little value.41 As a result of the Ruggles
report, the third patent statute42 was enacted in 1836, returning to the pre1793 examination system, and imposing for the first time an explicit
statutory bar to patentability in the case of prior "printed pUblications.,,43
The 1836 act provided:
[I]f ... it shall not appear to the Commissioner that the same
had been ... described in any printed publication in this or
any foreign country, or had been in public use or on sale with
the applicant's consent or allowance prior to the application,
if the Commissioner shall deem it to be sufficiently useful and
important, it shall be his duty to issue a patent therefor. 44

41. JOHN RUGGrns, SENATE REPORT ACCOMPANYING S. 239, 24TH CONGo at 3-4 (1st Sess.
1836).
42. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (1836) (amended 1870; repealed 1952).
43. See id. § 7, 5 Stat. at 119-20. Interestingly, U.S. Patent #1 (the earlier patents not having
been numbered) was issued to Senator Ruggles for a "Locomotive Steam-Engine for Rail and Other
Roads." U.S. DEP'TOFCOMMERCE, supra note 37, at 7. Nothing in the patent statute bars the grant
of a patent to a legislator. Then-Congressman Abraham Uncoln received U.S. Patent 6,469 for "A
Device for Buoying Vessels over Shoals." Id. at 9.
44. § 7,5 Stat. at 119-20 (emphasis added). The pertinent test reads:
[I]f, [upon examination], it shall not appear to the Commissioner that the same
had been invented or discovered by any other person in this country prior to the
alleged invention or discovery thereof by the applicant, or that it had been
patented or described in any printed publication in this or any foreign country, or
had been in public use or on sale with the applicant's consent or allowance prior
to the application, if the Commissioner shall deem it to be sufficiently useful and
important, it shall be his duty to issue a patent therefor. But whenever, on such
examination, it shall appear to the Commissioner that the applicant was not the
original and first inventor or discoverer thereof, or that any part of that which is
claimed as new had before been invented or discovered, or patented, or described
in any printed publication in this or any foreign country, as aforesaid, or that the
description is defective and insufficient, he shall notify the applicant thereof,
giving him, briefly, such information and references as may be useful in judging
of the propriety of renewing his application, or of altering his specification to
embrace only that part of the invention or discovery which is new.

1999)

INrERSEC170N OF CYBERSPACEAND PATENT LA W

241

Interestingly, the highlighted language was not present in the April 28
Senate report, and there appears to be no legislative history indicating the
reason for its inclusion or the manner in which it was introduced into the
final bill approved on July 4, 1836. No corresponding change was added
to the infringement defenses section,45 adding to the implication that
Congress did not devote significant attention to the issue.46
The 1836 statute also created a distinct Patent Office within the
Department of State and provided for internal appellate review and appeal
to the courtS.47 It was not until 1870 that the Patent Office began publishing
patents.48
D. The 1952 Statute
The latest major revision of the patent statute occurred in 1952.49 It
retained the bar to patentability of inventions previously described in a
patent or printed publication5o and added a new statutory bar to
patentability of inventions which were obvious in light of such
publications.51 The relevant statutory language currently reads:

[d. (emphasis added).
45. Section 15 of the 1836 patent statute provided that a defendant could plead any special
matter tending to prove that the invention "had been described in some public work anterior to the
supposed discovery thereof by the patentee, or had been in public use, or on sale, with the consent
and allowance of the patentee before his application for a patent" § 15,5 Stat. at 123. Under the
1870 re-enactment of the patent statute, the "public work" language was replaced by a defense that
the invention or discovery "had been patented or described in some printed publication prior to [the
plaintiffs] supposed invention or discovery thereof." Act of July 8,1870, ch. 230, § 61, 16 Stat.
198,208 (1870) (repealed 1952).
46. The issue would be whether a defendant could raise the defense that the patent was
invalid if it were anticipated by a printed publication which had not been identified by the patent
office during prosecution. Had it been identified during prosecution, the patent office would have
refused to issue the patent on the basis of the highlighted language. Thus, the patent should not have
been issued. However, once the patent had issued. the statute does not explicitly permit the
defendant to defeat an infringement suit based on a prior printed publication. This inconsistency
was corrected in the 1870 statute, see § 61. 16 Stat. at 208 , and does not appear to have been raised
in litigation in the interim.
47. See § 7, 5 Stat. at 119-20 (internal review); § 16,5 Stat. at 123-24 Gudicial review}.
Judicial appellate review was transferred, under the 1851 amendments, to the U.S. Court for the
District of Columbia, to the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in 1929, and then to the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982.
48. See § 20, 16 Stat. at 200; U.S. DEP'TOFCOMMERCE, supra note 37, at 14. Previously one
copy was retained by the patent office and one copy delivered to the inventor.
49. See Patent Act, ch. 950, 66 Stat 792 (1952) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293
(1994}).
50. See § 102,66 Stat. at 797-98.
51. See id. (codifying the judicial interpretation first adopted by the Supreme Court in
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Conditions for patentability; novelty and loss of right to
patent
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless(a)
the invention was known or used by others in this
country, or patented or described in a printed
publication in this or a foreign country, before the
invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(b)
the invention was patented or described in a
printed publication in this or a foreign country or in
public use or on sale in this country, more than one
year prior to the date of the application for patent in
the United States ... 52
Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not
identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102
of this title, if the differences between the subject matter
sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the
subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the
time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill
in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability
shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention
was made.53

N. THE "PRINTED PuBUCATION"
IsSUE IN THE CASES

The meaning of "printed publication" is thus central to patentability.54
The constitutionally mandated exchange of new knowledge for limited
monopoly, implemented by the section 102 bar of patentability of claims
already in the public domain, is determined most frequently by the
evidence of "printed publications.,,55 What, then, is a "printed pUblication,"
and how does it differ from a "publication" (or, for that matter, from a
"printing")? Precisely that question has been raised in a number of cases,
testing the 1836 formulation against then-modem technological advances.
Two theories emerged as to its application: one emphasizing "printed,"
the other emphasizing "publication." Since the original statutory language
predates even the typewriter (invented in 1867), and since the method of

Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 u.s. (11 How.) 248 (1850».
52. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b) (1994) (emphasis added).
53. [d. § 103.
54. For a general review see Kobylak, supra note 13.
55. See PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 1, § 706.02 (''By far the most frequent
ground of rejection is on the ground of unpatentability in view of the prior art ••.• n).
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printing employed in 1836 has become commercially infeasible, both
theories must employ some degree of speculation as to legislative purpose,
without engaging in the statutory construction debate between strict
construction and legislative intent analysis. The alternative would be to
read section 102 out of the statute.
A. The "Print" Theory of "Printed Publications"
What may be called the "print" theory holds that the statute requires
that a printed publication meet two tests: it must be published, and it must
be produced by a mass printing process.56 A document that meets these
tests is a "printed publication"-proof of actual public access to the
document is not required.57 Under this theory, even though information

56. See In re Tenney, 254 F.2d 619, 626 (C.C.P.A. 1958).
57. See itl. at 626-27. The Tenney court noted that it is
readily evident that what Congress was concerned with. both in 1836 and 1952,
was the probability that the subject matter would be made known to the American
public. Knowledge and use in the United States would probably (or so Congress
must have reasoned) come to the attention of the American people whereas the
same probability would not be present with respect to such knowledge and use
abroad. By the same token, in the case of "printed" publications, Congress no
doubt reasoned that one would not go to the trouble of printing a given description
of a thing unless it was desired to print a number of copies of it. •.•
But though the law has in mind the probability of public knowledge of the
contents of the publication. the law does not go further and require that the
probability must have become an actuality. In other words, once it has been
established that the item has been both printed and published, it is not necessary
to further show that any given number of people actually saw it or that any specific
number of copies have been circulated. The law sets up a conclusive presumption
to the effect that the public has knowledge of the publication when a single printed
copy is proved to have been so published.

Id. (footnote omitted).
In In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 221 (C.C.P.A. 1981), a document was held to be a printed publication
without any evidence that any member of the public actually had accessed it. See id. at 226-27. In
another case, the court was willing to infer public access prior to the critical date based on
ambiguous testimony as to the "normal" process of a university library. See In re Hall, 781 F.2d
897, 899-900 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding a doctoral thesis to be a printed publication). The court in
Ex parte Hershberger, 96 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 54, 56 (pat. Off. Bd. App. 1953), held that a single copy
of a college thesis was a printed publication despite restrictions placed on copying. The court noted
that access, rather than the ability to copy, determined "publication" status. See id. at 56-57. While
clearly correct as stated (the right to copy. even in the case of a book, being controlled by copyright
law), the statement overlooks the impact that the right to copy has on public access. In the case of
a book, there is presumably a broad right of the public to own a copy, not by copying, but by virtue
of the fact that publication makes multiple copies available for purchase. In the case of a single copy
which is deemed published solely because it is indexed in a library, the presumption of public
access inherently depends on interested parties being able to make their own copies.

244

FLORIDA L4. W REVIEW

[VoLSl

might be a "publication," in the sense that it has been made available to the
public, it still would not qualify as a section 102 reference if it were not
"printed.,,58 This theory is better understood in historical context. In a time
before typewriters, photocopiers, telefaxes and high-speed printers (much
less electronic mail and Web pages), the only means of permanent mass
dissemination of information was the printing press. Thus, an 1836
lawmaker trying to distinguish between "public" (meaning not trade secret)
information, and information that was both public in that sense and public
in the sense of being widely disseminated in a permanent form, could well
have chosen the words "printed publication" to convey that concept. As
explained in In re Tenney:S9 "Congress no doubt reasoned that one would
not go to the trouble of printing ... unless it was desired to print a number
of copies," therefore presumably increasing the likelihood of availability
to the public.60

B. The "Publication" Theory of "Printed Publications"
What may be termed the "publication" theory adopts a broad
interpretation of the term "printed," instead placing its focus on whether
a document has been made widely available to the public. As early as
1937, the Patent Office Board of Appeals recognized that the literal 1836
meaning of "printed" was an unworkable standard, since printing at that
time involved movable type, a process no longer in wide use in the 20th
century printing industry.6l In 1960, a district court foreshadowed the

58. This literal reading is supported by the "public use or knowledge" language of the same
statutory sections. See 35 U.S.C. § 102. If the "printed publication" clause is considered to require
public access independent of the means of publication, then presumably whatever is covered by the
"printed publication" language would also be covered by the "public knowledge" clause. The
implication of the use of the two clauses is that Congress perceived a difference between printed
and non-printed information. One difference may be based on the assumption that printed
documents can "travel" more easily and widely than people; thus, a printed document, wherever it
originates, may be presumed to reach an interested audience in the United States. A second
difference may be based on a concern that non-printed knowledge is more perishable than printed
knowledge. This latter difference cannot explain the geographic distinction of the two bars: 35
U.S.C. § 102 bars patentability if there has been a printed publication anywhere in the world, while
it bars patentability based on prior public use knowledge in the United States. See supra text
accompanying note 52 for the full language of the statutory section.
59. 254 F.2d 619 (C.C.P.A. 1958). Although stating the "publication" view, the Tenney court
concluded that the document sub judice, a microfilmed document, did not meet that standard for
a printed publication. See id. at 622.
60. Id. at 626.
61. See Gulliksen v. Halberg, 75 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 252 (pat. Off. Bd. App. 1937). In Gulliksen
the Board affirmed the dissolution of an interference (an internal procedure to determine priority
between two applicants for patents on the same invention) on the grounds that neither applicant was
entitled to the patent since it was anticipated by a printed publication. See id. at 254. The printed
pUblication was a typewritten thesis, bound and shelved at the Massachusetts Institute of
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"publication" theory when it interpreted "printed" as employing a method
by which many copies could be easily and quickly reproduced from one
standard article, so as to ensure general distribution and public disclosure. 62

Technology library. See id. at 253. It had been stipulated that the thesis was available to the public
prior to the bar date and that its contents anticipated the claimed invention. See id. The only issue
was whether the thesis was a "printed publication." See id. Although erroneously stating that the
printed publication requirement entered the patent statute in 1870, see supra note 44, the Board
stated:
at that time [1870], a printed publication could be produced in only one way, i.e.,
pieces of individual type were set by hand and after an amount equivalent to a
page had been composed, the type were locked in a frame, the face of the type
treated with a coating of ink and the paper was then pressed on the type to produce
an imprint It is, therefore, clear that at the time this term was placed in the patent
statutes it necessarily had a restricted and specific meaning, but since that date, the
art of printing has undergone many radical changes so that at the present day it
would be almost impossible to have any printing done in accordance with the
process in use in 1870. At the present time, practically all printed matter, including
court records, which are required to be in print, are printed on what is known as
a rotary press. In such a press, the printing face is made up not of movable type,
but of a cast cylinder which impresses only a line at a time as the paper is passed
beneath the roll. In addition, the term "printed" can be properly applied to a
process in which a stenciled sheet prepared on a typewriter, is used. In this latter
instance, no type is used in making the imprint, but according to the accepted
definition of the term "printed," the product resulting from the use of a
mimeographed sheet can properly be described as printed matter. It is therefore
apparent to us that at the present time the term "printed" cannot be given a specific
meaning. Instead, it is a general term defining an operation by which devices
carrying shapes of letters, characters, etc., are caused to leave a reproduction of
said letters, etc., impressed or fixed upon a sheet of paper or other material.

[d. at 253.

62. See Browning Mfg. Co. v. Bros, Inc., 126 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 499, 503 (D. Minn. 1960).
The court held that summary judgment on anticipation (based on drawings which were exhibited
at a trade show as part of a sales exhibition, but not distributed) was inappropriate given the factual
issues presented, but in so doing discussed the printed publication issue. See id. at 505.
The cases do not recognize any consistent definition and application of the term
"printed publication" as used in the statute. Compare the typewritten college thesis
cases, Hamilton Laboratories v. Massengill, 111 F.2d 584 (6th Cir. 1940); Ex
parte Hershberger, 96 U.S.P.Q. 54 (p.O.B.A., 1952); Gulliksen v. Halberg, 75
U.S.P.Q. 252 (p.O.B.A., 1937); with, Application of Tenney, 254 F.2d 619,117
U.S.P.Q. 348 (C.C.P.A. Patents, 1958); Permutit Co. v. Graver Corp., 43 F.2d
898,7 U.S.P.Q. 51 (7th Cir. 1930); Permutit Co. v. Wadham, 13 F.2d 454 (6th
Cir. 1926); Carter Products, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 130 F. Supp. 557, 104
U.S.P.Q. 314 (D. Md. 1955), affirmed, 230 F.2d 855,108 U.S.P.Q. 383 (4th Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 843, 111 U.S.P.Q. 467 (1956). In Application of
Tenney, supra, a microfilm copy of a German patent application placed in the
Library of Congress in Washington, D.C., after World War II was held not to be
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The theory is most clearly articulated in In re Wyer:63 a document is a
printed publication "whether ... printed ... on microfilm or a magnetic
disk or tape ... " if "available and accessible to persons concerned with the
art.,,64 The theory has become firmly established (if not universally
followed) in a series of cases reviewing the question whether a single copy
of a typewritten thesis, properly indexed in a publicly accessible library,
was a printed publication.6S Under the "publication" theory, what is central

a printed pUblication in that the method of reproduction was not a "mode of
producing copies which would ordinarily be used in making a large number of
copies so as to insure general distribution of publication." ... This would seem
to be the better rule for it is the ease of mass production that increases the
probability that the invention will be disclosed to the public for commercial
exploitation. The word "printed," as enacted in the statute, modifies ''publication'';
they must be read together. Printing, though not necessarily requiring the use of

a printing press, at least connotes a system ofreproduction whereby many copies
ofa document may be easily and quickly reproduced from one standard article
or set of symbols. Something more than public disclosure of any document is
meant; it is the method or mode of making the disclosures which is also material.
In the instant case, it does not appear how the drawings in question were
produced. • • . For all that the record shows, the drawings could have been
originals created through the use of manual drafting utensils or made by tracing[,]
neither of which process is printing.

Id. at 503 (emphasis added). The underscored language of the above formulation, of course, would
now make any data fixed on paper a "printed publication" because photocopying permits the
required easy and quick reproduction from a standard original.
63. 655 F.2d 221 (C.C.P.A. 1981). The Wyer court upheld the denial of a patent in light of
a microfilmed document, holding that such a document was a printed publication under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102. See id. at 227.

64. Id.
65. See, e.g., In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Hamilton Lab., Inc. v. Massengill,
III F.2d 584 (6th Cir. 1940). In a questionable extension of the principle, the board in Gulliksen
v. Halberg, 75 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 252, 253 (pat. Off. Bd. App. 1937), concluded that the document
was available as an anticipatory reference as of the date of its receipt by the library, not the date it
was indexed. This is contrary to the results reached in Canron, Inc. v. Plasser Am. Corp., 474 F.
SUpp. 1010 (B.D. Va. 1978), affd, 609 F.2d 1075 (4th Cir. 1979); Bergstrom v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 457 F. Supp. 213 (D. Minn. 1978), affd, 599 F.2d 62 (8th Cir. 1979); and Protein Found., Inc.
v. Brenner, 260 F. SUpp. 519 (D.D.C. 1966); and the position stated by the Patent Office in the
MANUAL OF PATENT ExAMlNING PROCEDURE, see PATENT&TRADEMARKOmCE, supra note 1, at
700-11; all of which hold that the effective date of a magazine is the date it reached an addressee,
not the date it was placed in the mail. Presumably, there is data on the reliability of mail delivery
which would permit a presumption that at least some magazine subscribers receive their magazines
in a timely fashion. It is doubtful that similar data on the indexing of material by libraries in general
exists. Thus, if magazines become anticipatory references upon receipt rather than mailing, it would
seem that, a fortiori, a document which is an anticipatory reference solely by virtue ofits availability
in a library should become so as of the date of indexing, rather than the date of receipt by the
library. In re Bayer, 568 F.2d 1357, 1362 (C.C.P.A. 1978), implicitly holds that the date of
indexing controls as the date of anticipation in cases where the document is a printed publication
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to the monopoly-for-information exchange is that the information be
placed widely and irretrievably in the hands of the public, and the 1836
Congress used the words "printed publication" in the context of printing
being the only reliable means of doing so.
While the "publication" theory tends to find anticipation and therefore
deny patentability in more cases than does the "print" theory, it should be
noted that the theories cannot be classified simply as "pro patentee" or
"anti-patentee." Even accepting the "publication" theory that printinRis the
only reliable means of assuring public access, the reverse is not necessarily
true. There are situations in which a document might be printed (in the
classical printing press sense) and published (in the classical multiplecopies-available for distribution sense), and therefore a "printed
publication" under the "printed" theory, yet not be a "printed publication"
under the "publication" theory if it could be shown that the public did not
in fact have access to the document. Such a case was presented in
Badowski v. United States,66 where a document published by the
government of the U.S.S.R. was held not to satisfy the "printed
publication" requirement because, although "printed" and "published," it
was difficult to obtain (and, presumably, not "public,,).67 The Court held

by virtue of library deposit. Accord Ecolochem, Inc. v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 863 F. Supp.
1165,1174 (C.D. Cal. 1994), modified, 91 F.3d 169 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The touchstone is not the
typewriter, but the placement of the document in a publicly accessible location coupled with means
for the public to know of the document's existence. Cf.ln re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158. 1161 (Fed.
Cir. 1989) (holding that a typewritten thesis, indexed in a shoebox in the library of a chemistry lab
and only by the student's name, was not a printed publication).
66. 164 F. Supp. 252 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
67. See itl. at 256. Badowski involved parachute technology, which was described in a Soviet
Air Force journal. See id. The U.S. government had tried unsuccessfully to obtain a copy of the
journal, finally doing so only after years of effort. See itl. It should also be noted that, although not
referred to in the decision, the case arose at the height of the Cold War, during a time when U.S.U.S.S.R. competition for scientific "firsts" gave rise to suspicion as to the authenticity. as well as
accessibility, of Soviet documents and the facts reported in them. See, e.g., Freeman v. Minnesota
Mining & Mfg., Co., 693 F. Supp. 134,149 (D. Del. 1988), afJ'd in part and vacated in part, 884
F.2d 1397 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (relying on the testimony of an expert witness that, in the 1970s, Soviet
research institutes were not open to foreigners and that visas were not reliably available).
Inaccessible documents (e.g., classified documents) cannot serve as references since they do not
put the information in question in the public domain. Classified documents have been held
unavailable as references. See Whitcomb v. American Airlines Inc., 164 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 610 (B.D.
Va. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 443 F.2d 630 (4th Cir. 1971); see also Wycoffv. Motorola,
Inc., 502 F. Supp. 77, 88 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (holding that a manual sold to the government prior to
the critical date "did not, as is required, place the claimed subject matter in the possession of the
public, since the publication remained secret within the U.S. government's hands only," and
rejecting the argument that distribution to the government was sufficient to constitute publication).
"The decided cases clearly indicate that distribution of printed documents by an independent
contractor to the customer or contracting party in connection with the contract work does not, in
and of itself, constitute a 'publication' of the documents." Id. at 88 (citing Dow Chern. Co. v.
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that "[t]he statutory language, 'printed publication,' implies that numerous
copies were printed and were made accessible to the general public.,,68
It is impossible to determine by purely grammatical analysis which
interpretation the legislature intended: Were they trying to subdivide what
was "printed" in the sense of being permanently recorded on paper (which
would include, for example, private letters) into that which was private and
that which was publicly accessible, or were they trying to subdivide what
was publicly accessible (in the sense of not being a trade secret) into that
which had been mass produced and that which had not? Accepting the
1836 premise that the only way to assure permanent public accessibility
was via the printing press (and remembering that even the invention of the
typewriter was still more than thirty years in the future when the 1836
statute was enacted), the two interpretations were indistinguishable. Once
the 1836 premise failed, the choice of theory mattered.69 With the
introduction of microfllm and the photocopier, technologies which did not

Williams Bros. Well Treating Corp., 81 F.2d 495,499 (10th Cir. 1936»; cf. Siemens-Blema AB
v. Puritan-Bennett Corp. 13 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1804, 1806 (S.D. Cal. 1989) (holding "[t]he
difficulty in locating ... documents does not diminish the public's right of access once they are
found").
The Patent Office's MANUAL OF PATENT BXAMINING PROCEDURE provides:
Bffective Dates of Declassified Printed Matter
In using declassified material as references there are usually two pertinent
dates to be considered, namely, the printing date and the publication date. The
printing date .•. may be considered as that date when the material was prepared
for limited distribution. The publication date is the date of release when the
material was made available to the public....
In the use of any of the above noted material as an anticipatory publication,
the date of release following declassification is the effective date of publication
within the meaning of the statute.
For the purpose of anticipation predicated upon prior knowledge under 35
U.S.C. § 102(a) the above noted declassified material may be taken as primajacie
evidence of such prior knowledge as of its printing date even though such material
was classified at that time. When so used the material does not constitute an
absolute statutory bar and its printing date may be antedated by an affidavit under
37 CFR 1.131. •••
PATENT & TRADEMARK OmCE, supra note I, at § 707.05(f).
68. Badowski, 164 F. Supp. at 255.
69. Many cases could still, of course, be resolved consistently under either theory. For
example, the court in In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d at 1161, held that a thesis indexed in a college library
by author's name only is not a printed publication. In In re Bayer, 568 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A.
1978), the court held that a thesis available only to three reviewers was not a printed pUblication
(because the probability of public knowledge of the contents of the document was virtually nil).
Viewed from a "print" standpoint. both references fail because they were typed, not printed. Viewed
from a "publication" standpoint. both fail because there was no way for the public to know of their
existence or find them without knowing of their existence.
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employ the movable type print of 1836, but which nevertheless permitted
wide public dissemination, the premise no longer held.

v. PRE-INTERNET DEVELOPMENT AND REsOLUTION
When Congress amended the patent statute in 1836 to add the "printed
publication" bar, mass distribution required printing on a press. As new
technologies for mass publication emerged, courts wrestled with the
boundaries of the definition of the word "printed."

A The Printing Press
Early cases rejected the argument that any document, simply by virtue
of being on paper, was a printed publication, generally on the theory that
public access was not achieved simply by placing an idea on paper.70
Alternative copying technology consisted of manually rewriting a copy
from an original, which was both time-consuming and posed the risk of
errors in the process.

B. Technology Breaks Through: The Typewriter
The first deviation from accep'tance of the printing press definition of
"printed" appears to be Gulliksen v. Halberg,?1 where the Patent Office
Board of Appeals ruled that a typewritten thesis, available at only one
library, was a printed publication. Although only one copy of the document
was proved to exist, and that copy was typewritten rather than printed on
a press, the board noted that it was a permanent, legible document, capable
of wide distribution (by photographic means) and accessible to the public,
and concluded that this satisfied the statutory requirement of a printed
publication.72 Gulliksen was followed in 1940 by Hamilton Laboratories
v. Massengill,73 the first appellate decision granting "printed publication"

70. See, e.g., Keene v. Wheatley, 14 F. Cas. 180, 192-93 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1861) (No. 7644).
Although a copyright infringement case, the court noted: ''Under the laws concerning patents for
inventions, a previous description of the alleged invention in a 'public work,' which means a
printed book, defeats a patent But such a description in an unprinted book has, in itself, no such
effect." Id. at 193. "Human means of increasing the number of copies by writing are extremely
limited. By printing, they may, on the contrary, in the words of Lord Cranworth, be multiplied
indefinitely." Id. at 192.
71. 75 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 252 (pat. Off. Bd. App. 1937). According to the dissent, "[t]he word
'printed' used in the statute has not received any extended discussion in the decisions dealing with
printed publications so thatit can be definitely ascertained what is comprehended within this word."
Id. at 254 (Edinburg, Exam'r in Chief, dissenting).
72. See id. at 253. Under this test, of course, any document becomes a printed publication
since it can be photocopied. Such a view compels the focus to shift from "printing" to "making
publicly accessible."
73. III F.2d 584 (6th Cir. 1940).
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status to a typewritten document. Again, this involved a thesis available in
a single college library, although available to students and patrons of other
libraries with exchange privileges.?4
The Patent Office Board of Appeals extended the definition by
including a typed document with handwritten elements as a printed
publication, in Ex parte Hershberger.?S The typed document was a thesis,
which included handwritten drawings and equations (the typewriter not
having the requisite symbols for typing equations).?6 The liberalization of
the definition of "printed publication" can, perhaps, be explained by the
perception that public access to university library materials had (whether
through improvements in indexing, transportation, or dissemination)
reached the level of public access to 1836 printing press produced
documents.??
Implicit abandonment of the literal printing requirement and
development of the general "publication" view can be seen in 1. C.E. Corp.
v. Armco Steel Corp.?8 The court in I.C.E. held that a reference may be a
printed publication if the document "has been disseminated or otherwise
made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled
in the subject matter or art, exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it
and recognize and comprehend ... the essentials of the claimed invention
without need of further research or experimentation.'t79 In 1967, a
typewritten paper distributed at a conference was held to be a printed
publication, a supportable reading of the statute only if publication is
deemed to mean made available in a public or non-confidential manner. 80
By 1971, the Third Circuit explicitly concluded: '''[P]rinting' is no
longer the only process synonymous with 'publication.' The emphasis,
therefore, should be public dissemination . . . and its availability and

74. See id. at 585.
75. 96 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 54 (pat. Off. Bd. App. 1953). The Board noted that modem inks had
become more permanent in character. See id. at 57.
76. See id. at 55. A hand printed paper in the Japanese language was held to be a printed
publication in Tyler Refrigeration Corp. v. Kysor Indus. Corp., 601 F. Supp. 590, 603-04 (D. Del.),
ajJ'd, 777 F.2d 687 (Fed. Cir. 1985) on the basis that Japanese language documents were
characteristically handwritten due to the large number of pictorial characters.
77. Most United States doctoral dissertations and a large number of masters theses are now
indexed, and publicly available, through University Microfilms International Dissertation Services,
which provides "xerographic" copies from microfilm.
78. 250 F. Supp. 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
79. Id. at 743.
80. See Deep Welding, Inc. v. Sciaky Bros., Inc., 417 F.2d 1227, 1235 (7th Cir. 1969). Note
that in the library indexing cases, at least the assumption can be made that ''the public" (i.e., anyone
with sufficient interest and training in the particular subject matter) should be able to gain access
to the document. In Deep Welding, however, it is difficult to see how such an assumption can be
made without further factual support (for example, that the conference was attended by people who
would in tum index the manuscript and make it available to ''the public").
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accessibility to persons skilled in the subject matter or art.,,81 In a 1974
decision, however, the Seventh Circuit maintained the ambiguous word
"printed" in concluding that: "[t]o constitute a printed publication ... all
that is required is that the document in question be printed and so
disseminated as to provide wide public access to it.,,82

C. The Expansion Solidifies: The Mimeograph
While caselaw on typewritten documents evolved along with
technological advances making dissemination of such documents easier,
and while microfilm technology is still in transition,83 the qualification of
mimeograph documents as references appears to have been established
without dissent. There appears to be no case holding that a mimeograph
was not a printed publication. As early as 1937, the patent office rejected
a patent based on the availability of a prior mimeographed document.84 The
explanation, although not explicit in the cases, seems obvious. While a
document might be microfilmed for one of two purposes (a means of
dissemination or a means of archiving, often accompanied by the
destruction or off-site storage of the original), the only reason for preparing
a mimeograph stencil is so that multiple copies can be made, therefore
presumably indicating an unambiguous intent to distribute and justifying
a presumption that publication was intended. As with typ~set documents,
if that presumption is rebutted (by showing that the document was
classified or deemed confidential), then the document is not a printed

81. Philips Elec. & Pharm. Indus. Corp. v. Thermal & Elec. Indus., Inc., 450 F.2d 1164, 1170
(3rd Cir. 1971); accord Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CeIIPro, 894 F. SUpp. 819 (D. Del. 1995). The
Philips court stated, however, that the party offering the document should prove that it had been
disseminated or otherwise made accessible to persons concerned with the art to which the document
related. See Philips, 450 F.2d at 1171.
82. Popeil Bros., Inc. v. Schick Elec., Inc., 494 F.2d 162, 166 (7th Cir. 1974). The Popeil
court invalidated a patent based on instruction books and advertising pamphlets distributed in
Japan. See id. at 167. Of course, the literal holding is uninformative, since the document in question
was "printed."
83. See infra notes 86-95 and aCcompanying text.
84. See Gulliksen v. Halberg, 75 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 252, 254 (pat. Off. Bd. App. 1937). The
Board later accepted a handwritten document as a printed publication in Ex parte Brendlein, 105
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 453, 454 (pat. Off. Bd. App. 1955), stating that the printed publication
requirement was satisfied where unlimited copies could be made. In Brendlein, the underlying
document was listed in a widely circulated (printed) bibliography, along with instructions for
ordering a copy produced from a microfilm master of the original paper copy. However, the court
was unclear as to whether the printed publication was the original paper copy or the microfilm
master. See id. A district court held a mimeograph document not to be a printed publication in
General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., but did so on the basis that the
document was confidential. See 349 F. SUpp. 345, 355 (N.D. Ohio 1972). Confidential documents
do not constitute printed pUblications, even if they are produced using a printing press. See supra
note 67.
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publication. 8s
D. Technological No-Man's Land: Microfilm
The third technological development to bring a new form of pUblication
under § 102 was microfIlm. Here, however, the caselaw remains unsettled
on fundamental issues.
In In re Tenney,86 the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals was
presented with the question whether a microfIlmed document was a printed
publication. The court concluded it was not, reasoning:
While microfIlming furnishes a means of mUltiplying copies,
there is no probability, from a mere showing that a microfIlm
copy of a disclosure has been produced, that the disclosure
has achieved wide circulation and that, therefore, the public
has knowledge of it. The nature of present day microfIlm
reproduction differs from normal printing methods. Though
one would be more likely than not to produce a number of
copies of printed material, one producing an item by
microfIlming would be as apt to make one copy as many. In
the case of printing, unless a number of copies were produced,
a waste of time, labor and materials would result; present day
microfIlming methods, on the other hand, are as well designed
to produce one microfIlm as well as many without waste.87
The court was, however, troubled by its conclusion, noting:
It is no doubt true that the present law is anomalous, as
evidenced by our conclusion that the microfIlm is not
"printed." A foreign patent fIle, laid open for public
inspection, is not a printed publication, because typewritten,

85. See General Tire, 349 F. Supp. at 354. The General Tire court discussed whether a class
of documents was intended for distribution:
The third classification of disputed references is the preliminary and final
mimeographed reports of the Wilmington Chemical Company. At least one of
these reports was distributed to several individuals in the rubber industry.
However, each was marked "Confidential." There is no evidence that
dissemination to the general public was intended, nor that the public had access
to the reports.
These reports fail as prior printed publications. They are not prior art under
35 U.S.C. § 102.

Id. at 355 (citations omitted).
86. 254 F.2d 619, 621 (C.C.P.A. 1958).
87. Id. at 627.
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while a printed publication, available to the public only in a
Southern Rhodesian library, would be. The former is
obviously more likely to reach the eyes of the American
public than the latter. It is obvious, however, that unless we
are to rewrite 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) for Congress, this must be
the result reached. Our job is to interpret the law, not to make
it.88
.
While the court was properly concerned about a policy concluding that
typewritten public documents were not "printed," while printed but less
publicly accessible documents were not, the concern does not seem to
follow from the court's premises. If in fact printing implies the intention
to produce a large number of copies, while microfIlming does not, then the
conclusion that a printed document would be available "only in a Southern
Rhodesian library" seems faulty.89 Implicitly, the court must have been
questioning the premises: by 1958, it was reasonable to question whether
the underlying assumption that printing implied the intention to produce
a large number of copies while microfIlming necessarily meant an
intention to maintain close control over a limited number of copies was
sound.
In 1962, the Patent Office Board of Appeals interpreted Tenney's
holding as limited to microfIlm that was indexed improperly, and
distinguished the pending appeal on the basis that the reference in dispute
had been indexed properly.90 Although following Tenney (and reaching the
same conclusion), the district court in General Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. ,91 was more precise in its focus on the reason
for denying printed publication status to microfIlms of war-era German
patents, maintained post-war by the u.S. government:
Not only are Firestone's microfilm references not
"printed," but there is no evidence of their publication.
Publication is not shown by mere evidence of ability to mass
produce. Directly in point are decisions which hold that
German GM's (Gebrauchsmustern) are not publications
although they are indexed, the index is published, and copies
of the GM are available to the public on request.
The German microfIlms fail as prior printed publications.

88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Ex parte Garbo, 803 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 315 (pat. Off. Bd. App. 1962). The Board also
noted, "In the four years since [Tenney] microfilm techniques have made significant advances in
the field of scientific information." Id. at 318.
91. 349 F. Supp. 345 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
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They are not prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102.92
The subtle shift between Tenney and General Tire is the recognition of
the possibility that a microfilmed document might be a printed pUblication
if there were evidence of publication93-presumably, of wide public
availability.94 Although not discussed in General Tire, the distinction
between properly and improperly indexed documents would logically be
one factor in determining public availability.95

E. The Envelope: Printed Publications "Written" on the Wind
In Gulliksen, the Patent Office Board of Appeals noted that the 18th
century method of printing was no longer commercially feasible and
looked for the purpose of the printed pUblication requirement, concluding:
[I]t is reasonable to infer that the framers of Section 4886 [the
predecessor of 35 § U.S.C. 102] intended by "a printed
publication" to mean a pUblication in which the text is fixed
or impressed on pages in contradiction to pUblication by such
fugitive means as lectures, gestures, etc. At the time this
statute was written, the only way in which a permanent record
could be made was either printing by means of type, or by
writing out same in longhand by means of a pencil or pen.
Longhand records were often difficult to decipher by reason

92. [d. at 355 (citations omitted).

93. Perhaps in an effort to insure against a remand of a case which had taken 20 years to bring
to trial, generating a 44,773 page transcript and over 100,000 pages of depositions and evidence,
see General Tire, 349 F. Supp. at 349 n.1, the court made this backup argument in Finding 127:
Since reproduction by microfilm is not "printing," these German references fail
as printed publications. Even if one were to consider them as being printed, they
fail as anticipations because the microfilmed material itself was not publicly
distributed. Instead, a list of the titles of the microfilmed material was published
as the Bibliography of Scientific and Industrial Reports (BSIR). The material was
so poorly indexed, however, that it was virtually inaccessible to a researcher.
Further, many frames of microfilm are poorly made and difficult to reproduce or
read accurately.
[d. at 386-87.

94. Several courts have now held that microfilm qualifies as printed, and that microfilm may
be a printed pUblication ifithas been made public. See In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 221 (C.C.P.A. 1981);
Philips Elec. & Pharm. Indus. Corp. v. Thermal & Elec. Indus., Inc., 450 F.2d 1164 (3rd Cir. 1971);
Ex parte Brendlein, 105 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 453 (pat. Off. Bd. App. 1955); I.C.E. Corp. v. Armco
Steel Corp., 250 F. Supp. 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). But see General Tire, 349 F. Supp. at 355. The
result in General Tire may be reconciled since the court found no evidence of actual dissemination
of the underlying document. See id.
95. See Garbo, 803 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office at 318
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of eccentricities in penmanship, and often the ink used was of
poor quality. Obviously, printing produced a far more
satisfactory record and would result in a wider distribution of
the knowledge contained therein. 96
Of course, as noted in Tenney,97 there are numerous handwritten
documents that are centuries old.
Although the circuit courts are split on the issue, there are cases holding
that a verbal presentation, accompanied by display of a document,
constitutes a printed publication. In Regents of University of California v.
Howmedica, Inc. ,98 the court held that a lecture accompanied by slides did
not create a printed publication, although noting that slides (had they been
distributed) could themselves be a printed publication.99 Browning
Manufacturing v. Bros, Inc. 1OO is in accord, holding that displaying a
printed document at a trade show was insufficient to make the document
a printed publication. lOl The Federal Circuit has gone both ways on the
issue, and has failed to provide a clear test for the status of a verbal
presentation accompanied by the display of printed materials. 102
The emphasis on public dissemination can be questioned as rendering
the printed publication provision surplus in light of the "known or used by
others" provision of section 102.103 If a printed publication is defined by its
accessibility to, and knowledge by, others in the United States, then what
does the printed publication bar add to the public knowledge bar? If it is
interpreted as adding nothing, then the interpretation violates the canon of
statutory construction that "courts should not interpret statutes in a manner
that renders terms of the statute superfluous."I04
It is clear, however, that modem cases have stepped away from a literal
reading of the printing press requirement and instead have admitted any
form of pUblication which appears to assure public access to the document

96. Gulliksen v. Halberg, 75 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 252, 253 (pat Off. Bd. App. 1937).
97. See supra note 59.
98. 530 F. Supp. 846 (D.N.J. 1981), ajJ'd without opinion, 676 F.2d 687 (3rd Cir. 1982).
99. See id. at 859-60.
100. 126 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 499 (D. Minn. 1960).
101. See id. at 503.
102. Compare Massachusetts Inst of Tech. v. AB Fortia, 774 F.2d 1104, 1109 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (holding that lhere was a printed publication under those circumstances), with Hybritech Inc.
v. Abbott Lab., 849 F.2d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1988), ajJ'g, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1006-07 (C.D.
Cal. 1987) (holding that lhere was no printed publication where only a limited number of printed
copies of a speech had been provided, on a restricted basis, to a journal review committee).
103. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
104. George Hyman Constr. Co. v. Occupational Safety & Heallh Review Comm'n, 582 F.2d
834,841 (4lh Cir. 1978); see also Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869, 877 (4lh Cir. 1996) ("A court
should not .•. construe a statute in a manner that reduces some of its terms to mere surplusage.").
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in question. 105 Although the statements of rationale vary, the following
principles of modem interpretation emerge from the cases. A publication
is not printed simply because it is on paper. For example, handwritten
notes or private letters, not filed in a public place, do not satisfy the
requirement. 106 Conversely, a publication need not be reproduced by a
printing press in order to be considered printed, if it is accessible to a
significant portion of the public which might find it of interest (not, it
should be noted, the entire public at large).107
While these might seem trivial interpretations of the statutory language,
they are at least interpretations. A strict, frozen at the time of passage,
interpretation of section 102 has been rejected, even though the statute has
been recodified twice since 1836 and the "printed publication" language
has survived legislative review intact. lOS Thus, it is possible to raise the
question of how to apply the underlying principle of section 102 to
emerging methods of communicating ideas.
If the underlying purpose of section 102 is to assure public
dissemination, then it is appropriate to view the cases as linked to the state
of technology at their date of decision. Thus, a holding that a microfilmed
105. Thus far, no court has extended the definition of "printed" to information which is not
transmitted in a tangible form. Even the lecture cases, see supra notes 98-102 and accompanying
text, involved the display, if not the transfer of possession, of tangible documents.
106. The leading treatise of the 19th Century, 1 WIWAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAw OFPATENTS
FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS 446-47 (Sage Hill Publishers, Inc. 1971) (1890) (footnotes omitted)
comments as follows:
[Tlhe publication must be: (1) A work of public character, intended for general
use.•••
A work of public character is such a book or other printed document as is
intended and employed for the communication of ideas to persons in general, as
distinguished from particular individuals. Private communications, although
printed, do not come under this description, whether designed for the use of single
persons or of a few restricted groups of persons.
One writer has, however, proposed that the test should be "if any person other than the inventor
has possession of a non-restricted ••. disclosure of the invention, then that particular disclosure
must be considered a printed publication." Richard W. Hoffman, Comment, What Constitutes a
Printed Publication Under the Patent Act, 1988 DET. C.L. REv. 961,972. While this proposal would
provide a bright line test, it would make collaborations and venture financing virtually impossible.
Many collaborators and venture capital firms will not agree to confidentiality, and it is difficult to
monitor even formal publications in a business or academic environment; setting and enforcing policies
for all disclosures would be impractical. Finally, any gain in clarity of statement would likely be at
the expense of complication of evidentiary issues.
107. See In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1989); In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 221 (C.C.P.A.
1981); Hamilton Lab., Inc. v. Massengill, 111 F.2d 584 (6th Cir. 1940): accord In re Bayer, 568
F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (stating the principle although holding it not satisfied in the case sub
judice).
108. See supra notes 41-53 and accompanying text
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document is not a "publication" should, although stated in absolute terms,
be viewed as a holding that a microfIlmed document is not a "publication"
under the then-current state of microfIlm technology. 100 Therefore, whether
the Internet is a printed publication medium or not depends on the thencurrent state of Internet technology. As the typewriter cases show,uo
changes in the underlying technology, or changes in public acceptance and
use of the technology, can produce changes in the legal result.

VI. THE INTERNET
As new methods of disseminating information have become available,
the definition of "printed publication" has expanded by extending the reach
of "printed" to include documents which are not typeset. If the caselaw
could expand the meaning of "printed" to include documents which are not
typeset, could it not also expand to include information which is not a
tangible document?
The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure,111 containing the patent
office's internal guidelines for review of patent applications, neither directs
nor forbids patent examiners to make use of Internet resources as
references. It has been suggested by one commentator that data stored in
computers are likely to be considered printed publications. 112 This
suggestion appears to have contemplated that the information would be
stored on a publicly accessible computer from which members of the
public could retrieve copies.ll3 In that context, and assuming that the
documents on the computer were properly indexed so as to allow
identification of relevant information by members of the public interested
in the art, this conclusion appears consistent with the trend of reasoning in
modem cases. 114

109. Such a view is implicit in the recognition of advances in microfilm technology which at
least partly underpins Ex parte Garbo, 803 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 315,318 (pat. Off. Bd. App. 1962),
justifying a decision at variance with the prior Board decision in Tenney. See supra note 59.
110. See supra notes 71-82 and accompanying text.

111. PATENf&TRADEMARKOFFICE,Supranote 1.
112. See Kobylak, supra note 13, at 812 (acknowledging, however, that no court had yet
addressed the issue).
113. See id. at 813. "[C]ounsel may therefore expect the court' s inquiry to focus on the number
of computer terminals having access to the computer' s data storage as well as the number of persons
serviced by those terminals." ld. An example of a publicly accessible database would be LEXIS.
Note that such a database does not pose the issues raised herein in connection with Internet
publications: it is under the control of a disinterested third party, it is maintained permanently, the
date of accession is established and maintained by a disinterested third party, and it is searchable.
Should such a database be maintained on the Internet, as LEXIS is, it would not lose its status as
a printed publication; however, it does not follow that merely placing data on the Internet per se
creates a printed publication. See supra note 16.
114. It should be noted that the revisers of the Uniform Commercial Code, although
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The argument in favor of printed publication status for Internet
publications can be summarized as follows. Philips Electronic &
Pharmaceutical Industries Corp. v. Thermal & Electronics Industries,
Inc. 1lS acknowledges that the patent statute is not "bound solely to the
traditional method of the printing press" but must take into account
contemporary technology. 116 Philips and In re Wyer ll7 hold that the critical
elements are the degree of dissemination and accessibilityY8 Wyer even
states, in dictum, that magnetic storage can qualify as a printed
publication. 1l9 Modem computer technology has provided a low cost and
ease of access which satisfies the requirement of the possibility of easy and
quick reproduction under Browning Manujacturing. l2o The fundamental
patent tradeoff is limited term monopoly in exchange for information
otherwise unavailable to the public. What could be more public than
something posted on the Internet?
However appealing this argument is in its simplicity, it must pass two
tests. It must show that an Internet posting meets the explicit holdings of
the caselaw, and it must show that there are no implicit, underlying
assumptions in the caselaw that would not apply equally with respect to
Internet postings. Failing either test, the argument must be rejected and
Internet postings cannot bar patentability under section 102(a).l2l
A. Do Internet Postings Meet the Holdings
oj Current Caselaw?
It is easy to dispose of one hurdle to acceptance of Internet postings as
printed pUblications: as posted, Internet documents are not printed in any
sense of the word. They can be transferred to paper, but as posted, they are

acknowledging the pressure of electronic commerce, concluded:
The definition of"document" contemplates and facilitates the growing recognition
of electronic and other nonpaper media as "documents," however, for the time
being, data in those media constitute documents only in certain circumstances .••.
The fact that data transmitted in a nonpaper (unwritten) medium can be recorded
on paper by a recipient's computer printer, facsimile machine, or the like does not
under current practice render the data so transmitted a "document."
U.C.C. § 5-102, cmt. 2 (1995).
115. 450 F.2d 1164 (3rd Cir. 1971).
116. See id. at 1170.
117. 655 F.2d 221 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
118. See id. at 227; Philips, 450 F.2d at 1170.
119. See Wyer, 655 F.2d at 227.
120. See Browning Mfg. Co. v. Bros, Inc. 126 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 499, 503 (D. Minn. 1960).
121. A separate issue, beyond the scope of this article, is whether they might bar patentability
under section 102(b).
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electronically stored data. This is true, however, of microfIlm as well. It
can be used to produce a paper image but it is not, itself, such an image. l22
Although not unanimous, the trend of the caselaw is to admit microfIlm (at
least if it is indexed and members of the public can order printed copies)
as a printed publication. l23 Furthermore, although it is doubtful that the
Wyer court anticipated the development of the Internet,l24 that court did
state that a document is a printed publication "whether ... printed ... on
microfIlm or a magnetic disk or tape ... if available and accessible to
persons concerned with the art."I25 Although transmitted over the Internet,
the documents exist, at least initially, on a magnetic disk on a host
machine. Therefore, under current caselaw, courts should not reject
Internet po stings as printed pUblications solely because postings initially
exist in electronic form.
The Wyer test, however, also requires accessibility to persons
concerned with the art. l26 In one sense, the Internet represents the ultimate
in accessibility, allowing multiple, simultaneous access by individuals at
the far ends of the earth. However, accessibility means more than the right
to look, it also means the ability to find.
The cases do not explicitly distinguish these two aspects of
accessibility, but in order for a document to be publicly accessible, the
public must be entitled to at least see, if not copy, the document1 27 and the
public must be able to locate the document and distinguish it from among
other, irrelevant, documents. l28 An interesting test of this latter point is the
treatment accorded the United States Patent Office's own records. Once a
United States Patent is issued, the documents related to its handling in the
Patent Office (known as the "fIle wrapper" or "prosecution history")
become public. In Camp Brothers & Co. v. Portable Wagon Dump &
Elevator Co., 129 the court held that the contents of a patent application fIle

122. Cj. Benchcraft, Inc. v. Broyhill Furniture Indus., Inc., 681 F. Supp. 1190,1200 (N.D.
Miss. 1988). In Benchcrajt, the court held that a photograph qualified as a printed publication. See
id. To be precisely on point, the court would have to have held the negative from which the
photographs were printed was the printed publication.
123. See, e.g., Wyer, 155 F.2d at 227.
124. It is likely that the Wyer court was envisioning the magnetic disk itself being copied and
the copies distributed. An Internet document would not be distributed in this way. Instead, the
original document would more likely be stored, in digital form, on a magnetic (or optical) disk and
distribution would take place by electronic transfer of the information over communication lines.
The second copy of the information could then be stored on a second, remote, magnetic disk which
would not be a duplicate of the original disk-it is the information content which would be
duplicated.
125. Wyer, 655 F.2d at 227.
126. See id.
127. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
129. 251 F. 603 (7th Cir. 1917).
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were not printed pUblications because of ''the practical impossibility of. . .
the search" to find what "lies buried in some one file wrapper of the
infinite number [offlle wrappers] in the Patent Office.,,130
Internet postings clearly satisfy the ftrstrequirement (the "right to look"
requirement): it would be hard to argue that information posted on the
Internet was not intended to be publicly accessible.l31 However, even
though Int~rnet postings satisfy the frrst requirement, current indexing of
Internet postings does not satisfy the second requirement-the ability to
find. 132 While indexing is improving, the task is formidable. As of January
1998 there were over 29 million Internet hosts, up from 16 million in
January, 1997, and over 2.2 million Web servers.133 As of 1995, over
130,000 articles per day were being posted to Usenet sites. 134 The numbers
are growing dramatically.13S
On this ground, general Internet postings do not satisfy the
requirements for printed publications. 136 The underlying test of printed
publication status is public accessibility. Accessibility requires more than
theoretical access; it also requires the ability to separate relevant
documents from at least the great majority of irrelevant documents. The
130. Id. at 608. Since the Patent Office still does not provide a comprehensive public index
to the contents of patent application files, presumably Camp Brothers would be decided the same
way today. But see Vass v. Multi Med Indus., Inc., 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1071, 1073 (B.D.N.Y.
1979).
131. An issue might be raised as to whether the posting was lawful. See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd.
v. Maphia, 857 F. Supp. 679, 686 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (discussing copyright infringement when
unauthorized copies of a game were uploaded to the Internet); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom Online Communication Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1241 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (discussing copyright
violation in posting selections ofL. Ron Hubbard's work on the Internet); Religious Tech. Ctr. v.
Lerma, 897 F. Supp. 260, 263 (B.D. Va. 1995) (discussing confidential church documents posted
on the Internet). Even linking to an Internet Web site is arguably an infringement of the copyright
of the linked Web site. See Futuredontics, Inc. v. Applied Anagrarnics, Inc., 45 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
2005,2007-09 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (denying motion to dismiss such a claim). However, all that is
required of a printed publication is accessibility, not the right to copy. Thus, cases challenging the
scope of copyright on the Internet would not impact this analysis any more than cases challenging
the unlicensed copying of a book or magazine article would impact the status of that book or article
as a printed publication. Moreover, the issue would only be presented as to those postings where
the poster was not the copyright owner.
132. While there are a number of "search engines," such as Yahoo, HotBot, etc., there is no
general index to the Internet, nor, as the figures suggest, is such an index likely to become available
in the near future.
133. See Robert H. Zakon, Hobbes' Internet Time Line 4.0, (visited Feb. 25, 1999)
<http://www.isoc.orglguestlzakonlInternetlHistoryIHIT.htrnl>.
134. Seeid.
135. See id.
136. This is not to say that certain specialized collections ofdocuments made available through
the Internet might not qualify if they were adequately indexed and known to those interested in the
art. Simply because it is available on the Internet does not disqualify an otherwise qualifying
document as a printed publication.
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Internet does not currently provide this capability.
B. Do the Implicit Assumptions of the Cases
Apply to Internet Postings?
If the literal language of the cases were to be viewed as broad enough
to cover Internet postings, it would then be necessary to examine the
assumptions underlying the cases and to determine whether those
assumptions were equally valid with respect to Internet postings. The
official defInition of the Internet, to the extent there is one, is reflected in
an October 24, 1995 resolution of the Federal Networking Council:

"Internet" refers to the global information system that(i)

is logically linked together by a globally unique
address space based on the Internet Protocol (IP) or its
subsequent extensions/follow-ons;

(ii)

is able to support communications using the
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol
(TCPIIP) suite or its subsequent extensions/follow-ons,
and/or other IP-compatible protocols; and

(iii)

provides, uses or makes accessible, either publicly or
privately, high level services layered on the
communications and related infrastructure described
herein. 137

Internet pages are stored electronically, traI1:smitted digitally, and
displayed as ephemeral images on computer screens. No literal reading of
the phrase "printed publication" could seriously be thought to encompass
such images, and even the most liberal interpretation of "printed
publication" still requires a "document." For all the stretching of the
statute, courts have dealt, at least at the literal level, with a document that,
for the whole of its existence, was fIxed and unchanging. The majority of
the courts gave "printed publication status" only where the document was
safe-either widely distributed or in the care of a public institution. 138 The
Internet is an ever-changing landscape. While a thesis indexed in a library
is unchanged and can always be found in that library, a Web page may
disappear without a trace. As Justice Stevens noted in Reno v. American

137. FNC Resolution: Definition of "Internet," (visited Feb. 25, 1999)
<http://fnc.govlInternecres.html>.
138. See, e.g., Ex parte Hershberger, 96 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 54 (pat Off. Bd. App. 1952).
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Civil Liberties Union, 139 newsgroup postings are regularly purged. 140 Is the
information "available" to the public if it once was but no longer is? Is the
indexing system available on the Internet sufficient to assure public
accessibility?
The cases on printed pUblications appear to assume that:

1. Printing evidences an intent to make a document
publicly available, meaning, as discussed above, that it
is accessible and can be found.
2. Once a document has become publicly available, it will
remain so.
3. Once publicly available, the form and content of a
document will remain fIXed.
4. A publicly available document can have assigned to it
a verifiable date of pUblication.
The first assumption is easily shown to be correct. As explained in In
re Tenney,141 "Congress no doubt reasoned that one would not go to the
trouble of printing ... unless it was desired to print a number of copies,"
therefore presumably increasing the likelihood of availability to the
public. 142 In the Internet context, it is no "trouble" to make a number of
copies. The attraction of the Internet as a publishing medium lies in its
cheap and simple (to the end user) ability to produce a large number of
copies, the number dependent solely on the demand for the information.
Although the poster does not demonstrate an intent to make the
information widely available through "the trouble" of posting, it would be
difficult to argue that a general posting to the Internet did not carry with it
the intent to offer wide public availability. It should be noted that several
cases indicate that posters do not intend to permit unrestricted copying, but
simply access. 143 The printed publication cases do not, however, require
unrestricted copying, simply accessibility, and to require otherwise would
conflict with the copyright statute. 144
A second, more troubling, assumption, however, is the assumption of

139. 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
140. See id. at 2335.
141. 254 F.2d 619 (C.C.P.A. 1958).
142. [d. at 626.
143. See supra note 131.
144. Such a requirement would particularly conflict with 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994) which grants
a copyright owner the exclusive right to copy and prepare derivative works, subject to public policy
exceptions contained in 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-120 (1994). None of the exceptions requires surrendering
a copyright as a precondition to a work being a reference under the patent law, and such an
exception would lead to the absurd result that the author of a work could determine whether or not
an unrelated invention was patentable.
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permanent public access. This assumption has two components. The
assumption that, once released to the public, the printed publication cannot
be destroyed or otherwise withdrawn from the public. 145 And the
assumption that, once released to the public, the printed pUblication will
remain invariable.
For example, an Internet Web page may be created and stored on a
single computer. It may be accessed remotely by virtue of its connection
to the Internet and its construction according to Internet protocols. It is
possible that it will be duplicated at a so-called "mirror site," but
duplication on such a site does not follow automatically from mere
presence on the Internet. It also is possible that some or all of the contents
of the Web page will be duplicated, either by creating an electronic copy
on a second computer or by printing the page. 146 It is not, however, inherent
in the posting itself that either will take place, nor is it certain that the Web
page will be indexed by any of the automatic search engines in a fashion
that will be accessible to those interested in the art. 147
It is thus possible that the decision of a host of a particular Web site to
discontinue hosting, or to remove a document from that particular site, may
in fact withdraw the document from the public. This would be analogous
to the recall and destruction of an entire run of books or magazines;
however, the difficulty of doing so is by no means analogous. Because of
the considerably greater difficulty of destroying an entire edition of a
printed magazine or book once published, the transfer of information
through such a medium to the public domain is much more certain than the
transfer of Internet posted information. It is also possible that decisions by,
or events beyond the control of, a particular host will deprive the public of
access to a document, either temporarily148 or permanently.149 Again, the

145. Of course, if all copies are inaccessible, the issue does not arise. An interesting case
would be presented if all public copies had become unavailable and the only surviving copies were
in the hands of the litigants.
146. Technically, what a user sees on a computer screen is not a copy of what is on the host
computer, and what is printed from the Web page is not a duplicate of what is on the host computer
(or, necessarily, what is on the user's screen); rather, each is a derivative work in the copyright
sense. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). The party hosting the Web page has considerable control over
what can be printed and how it will appear.
147. Automatic search engines, such as Yahoo, HotBot, Lycos, and others, index certain
words; they do not index concepts. Therefore, unless the author of a Web page chooses words
which would be used by the searcher to describe the concept that is being searched for, the
automatic index will not locate the document This has particular relevance to the discovery and use
ofinforrnation from analogous arts, where different jargon (or, even worse, acronyms) may be used
to describe the concept of interest
148. In 1996, subscribers to America Online and Netcom were denied access for nineteen and
thirteen hours, respectively, due to lack of capacity. See Zakon, supra note 133. On July 17,1997
an error at Network Solutions caused the DNS table (the table which correlates domain names with
their Internet addresses) for .com and .net "to become corrupted, making millions of systems
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likelihood of such an event terminating public access to a published book
or magazine is remote.
For similar reasons, the assumption that a posting to the Internet will
remain unchanged as it is disseminated can easily be shown to be
unwarranted. The data which presents a Web site are stored electronically
in digital format. As such, the data, and thereby the image presented to a
visitor to the site, are easily modified. Digital modifications are difficult,
if not impossible, to detect. 150 Thus, possession by the public of access to
a particular purported copy of an Internet "publication" does not assure
public access to the original information.
Should the issue arise as to which of several purported "originals" was
in fact the original, the accuracy of a fourth underlying assumption must
be questioned: can it be assumed that the date of pUblication of each copy
can be accurately determined? Two patentability issues are controlled by
the date of pUblication: the so-called "critical date" under section 102 (the
date on which the reference became available to the public and therefore
available as a potential bar to patentability) and the general knowledge and
belief of one of "ordinary skill in the art" under section 103.
As discussed above,151 a reference can anticipate a claim to a patent
only if the reference was either prior to the claimed date of invention or
more than one year prior to the United States application date. Similarly,
when determining whether a collection ofreferences invalidates a claim for
obviousness under section 103, one factor is what those of ordinary skill
in the art believed at the time the invention was made. 152 A document
indicating that, on that date, the claimed invention was already known or
believed to be possible would likely negate patentability. But a document
indicating that, on that date, it was widely believed that the invention was
impossible, would argue in favor of patentability.
With a journal article, or even a single indexed thesis, it is possible to
determine a date of public accessibility. Again, because of the electronic
nature of the Internet and the control exercised by the host of the data, it is

unreachable." [d.
.
149. In 1996, InterNic unlisted 9,272 organizations' domain names for failure to pay their
domain name fee. See id. As noted in Reno \I. American Civil Liberties Union, 117 S. Ct. 2329,
2335 (1997), ''In most newsgroups, postings are automatically purged at regular intervals." It is,
of course, possible that prior to the demise of a site or the purging of a message, it will have been
copied and stored elsewhere, but the test of printed publication status is continued public
accessibility.
150. Encryption techniques may be used to authenticate digital documents, but such techniques
rely on independent knowledge of characteristics of the original document. Furthermore, most Web
pages are not currently authenticated.
151. See supra note 65.
152. See supra note 9 for the full text of section 103.
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possible for a host to provide an inaccurate date of public availability.ls3
It thus appears that several of the underlying assumptions which
allowed the expansion of the term "printed publication" in prior cases
cannot safely be made with respect to the Internet as it exists today.
Therefore, Internet postings do not constitute "printed publications" under
section 102.

VlI. IF NOT Now, WHEN?
At fIrst glance, the question posed at the outset, ''Will the principal
research tool of the next decade be considered part of this statute-defIned
guardian of the public domain?" appears to answer itself. Although a
concern should be noted as to the risk that the public domain will be so
inundated with prior art as to make defmition of the boundary of the public
domain impossible,ls4 the simple answer to this concern is that neither the
Constitution nor the caselaw require an a priori defmition of the public
domain. What is required is protection of the public by limiting the grant
of patent rights to situations where the public benefIts by addition of
knowledge not already in the public domain.
With this goal, it is troubling to conclude that the dominant research
tool of any future age will be excluded from consideration in patentability
determinations. The fundamental rule of patentability is that monopolies
are not awarded for what is already in the public domain. Therefore,
whatever tools are available to place information in the hands of
researchers should also withdraw that information from the reach of patent
applicants.
This intuitive response turns out to be incorrect, at least with respect to
the 1999 Internet. The current state of development of the Internet does not
permit data disseminated on the Internet to satisfy the requirement of a
printed publication under section 102. The data is transitory, it is not
necessarily available to the public (partly because of the absence of
effective indexing and partly because of the ability to modify), it is capable

153. The dale of posting would be a relevant, but not necessarily controlling date. Under the
majority of the magazine cases, see supra note 65, the critical date is not the date on the cover but
the date of actual delivery to a subscriber. The analogous date for the Internet would be the date a
second party actually received (in the electronic mail context) or visited (in the Web site context).
This data can be collected by the host, but again if the host chose to falsify the data, the change
would be difficult if not impossible to detect.
154. One factor not discussed in the cases is the braking effect of printed publications in the
printing press sense. In order to have a document published by press printing, significant effort was
involved and, not only did this indicate a commitment to public dissemination by the author, but
also the likelihood that someone (such as a book publisher or magazine editor) shared the view that
such dissemination was warranted.
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of after-the-fact manipulation, ISS and it is not necessarily date-verifiable.
Simply because data is disseminated on the Internet would not, however,
deprive it of printed publication status if it were otherwise a printed
publication.
Having concluded that the Internet is not currently at a stage of
development to qualify as a medium of "printed publications" under
section 102, the next question is "when will it be?" More precisely, what
must change in order for Internet dissemination to qualify? The simple
answer is that the lack of assured, continued, effective accessibility
identified above must be addressed. Anyone of three events could do so:
broad evolution of the Internet itself, directed creation of a "trusted"
subdivision of the Internet, or legislation.

A. Evolution
As with prior technologies, 156 if the Internet develops in such a way that
makes it probable that a researcher in the field would find the data (for
example, if indexing improved so as to make data retrievable and verifiable
as to content and date of publication), then without more, data on the
Internet would qualify as a printed publication. At least at the circuit court
level, the line has been crossed too often and too consistently to fear a
holding that electronic transfer, per se, will prevent a document from being
considered a printed publication. The issues raised above go not to the
electronic nature of Internet documents but solely to the current
consequences of that electronic nature.
B. Directed Creation
Alternatively, an Internet library of specific data could be created for
the sole purpose of making such data qualify as a printed publication under
section 102(a). Recalling that the problem with Internet dissemination is
that it does not meet the indexing, permanent accessibility, or verifiable
dating requirements, none of these problems are beyond the technically
achievable scope of the Internet, at least with respect to documents as to
which a conscious choice of inclusion is made.
One possible blueprint for a trusted archive which would meet the
requirements of the caselaw would be as follows:
Ownership-The archive would need to be owned (i.e.,

155. It must be conceded that Ex parte Hershberger. 96 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 54 (pat. Off. Bd.
App. 1952). held that a thesis was a printed pUblication even though it was in a loose leaf binder.
See id. at 57. Instinctively. a document in a looseleaf binder strongly suggests at least the risk of
undetected alterations.
156. See supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text (discussing microfilm technology).
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hosted) by an organization perceived as sufficiently
independent of interested parties. Possibilities would include
government agencies, universities, or independent groups
formed for the purpose. It would be desirable, although not,
under current cases, necessary, to make provision for mirror
sites both as an additional assurance of continued availability
and for the practical reason that demand for access to the
archive might be high enough to overwhelm a single site.
Financial stability-The owner would need to have sufficient
financial backing to assure continued existence of the archive
and access to the public. This could, in part, be based on fees
charged for placing documents in the archive and fees charged
for access.l~
Indexing-The archive would need to be indexed in such a
way that those having an interest in a particular art could find
relevant documents within a comparatively small group of
documents. Thus, the indexing would need to both provide a
likelihood of identifying relevant documents in the area
sought and a likelihood of excluding a large proportion of
irrelevant documents. The specifics would vary from art to
art-a problem in nuclear physics could probably be focused
more narrowly than a problem in furniture-making, both
because of the relative ages of the technology and the relative
specificity of the processes.
Dating and preservation-The archive would need to create
and maintain a verifiable date stamp associated with each
document. In light of the inconsistent caselaw with respect to
the critical date for library stored documents and for
magazines,158 it would be prudent to store both the date on
which the document was received b~ the archive and the date
it was made available to the pUblic. 1 9 A technical solution for
assuring authenticity and date of submission exists in
currently available Public Key Encryption technology. For
example, the archive could provide an encrypted electronic
receipt including the original document and the date it was
received.

157. No case has required that a document must be available free of charge in order to be
considered a printed publication and, in fact, typically they are not. Magazines and books are
typically sold; the Patent Office charges for copies of United States Patents.
158. See supra note 65.
159. Even ifnot required for section 102 purposes, this dual date storage would have the added
benefit of providing evidence of the state of public knowledge for section 102 and section 103
purposes.
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Such an archive would also need to resolve other practical problems.
Incentives-Even if deposit were free, it would involve an
investment of time and it would deprive the author of the
ability to withdraw the pUblication from the public domain. If
created legislatively, deposit with the archive could be made
a condition of copyright registration (currently, although not
a condition of copyright protection, the Register of Copyrights
can request that a copy of any registered work be deposited
with the Library of Congress, and sanctions are provided for
failure to comply),16O although this would only capture
documents which the author sought to copyright, and could
exclude a large fraction of Internet documents. In order to
obtain non-copyrighted documents (or if the archive were
created by a private organization with no power to compel
deposits), some incentive would need to be provided to
encourage authors to submit documents.
Copyright-Anyone other than the author161 would need to
deal with the author's copyright. Putting aside the issues
which arise once the archive has a legitimate copy of the
material in question,162 there must at some point be a
document or electronic version transferred to the archive. This
document or electronic version could not be created without
the author's permission or an exemption from copyright

160. Under 17 U.S.C. § 407(d) (1994), the Library of Congress may request a copy of any
published work submitted for copyright registration. Failure to provide the requested copy forfeits
registration. See id.
161. In light of the question of who will have the incentive to spend the time, effort, and
money, it is likely that parties other than the author will want to provide documents to the archive.
162. Those issues would include: Whether viewing a document through the Internet infringe
the copyright owner's rights and whether copying the document to the archive's storage medium
infringe the copyright owner's rights oris it sanctioned by 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1994) or by 17 U.S.C.
§ 117 (1994), which provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement for the
owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of
another copy or adaptation of that computer program provided:
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the
utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and
that it is used in no other manner, or
(2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and that all
archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued possession of the
computer program should cease to be rightful.
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infringement.

C. Legislation
Congress could solve the archive copyright problem by legislation
amending the copyright statute. It has previously created exceptions to the
copyright statute, for example, fair use,163 library and archive copying, 164
ephemeral recordings l6S and compulsory licenses for phonorecords and
cable. 166
More directly, Congress could amend section 102 of the patent statute
to address the Internet specifically and make it a print medium by
legislative fiat. The section 102 denial of patentability over prior printed
publications is not constitutionally required, and in fact did not exist as part
of the statutory scheme unti11836. 167 Patents are not based on a common
law right, but are purely a federal legislative right. 168 Congress may
exercise the legislative right to exclude certain classes of inventions from
patent protection,169 and courts have denied patents based on public

163. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) provides that: "the fair use of a copyrighted work ••. for purposes
such as criticism, comment. news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright."
164. 17 U.S.C. § 108 provides that:
[I]t is not an infringement of copyright for a library or archives ••• to reproduce
no more than one copy or phonorecord of a work, or to distribute such copy or
phonorecord, under the conditions specified by this section if(1) the reproduction or distribution is made without any purpose of
direct or indirect commercial advantage;
(2) the collections of the library or archives are (i) open to the public,
or (ii) available not only to researchers affiliated with the library or
archives or with the institution of which it is a part, but also to
other persons doing research in a specialized field; and
(3) the reproduction or distribution of the work includes a notice of
copyright

165. See 17 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
166. See 17 U.S.C. § 111(d) (1994) (requiring compulsory license for cable systems); 17
U.S.C. § 115(a) (1994) (requiring license for distributed phonorecords).
167. See supra note 41-48 and accompanying text
168. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229-30 (1964); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1994)
(conferring exclusive federal judicial jurisdiction over patent matters). James Madison observed,
in The Federalist, that with respect to patents and copyrights "[t]he States cannot separately make
effectual provision for either." THE FEDERAUST No. 43, at 272 (James Madison) (1937).
169. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a) (1994) (excluding certain nuclear energy technology from
patent protection); see also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,318 (1980) ("Congress is free
to amend section 101 so as to exclude from patent protection organisms produced by genetic
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disclosures, which were not printed in the 1836 sense, for more than fifty
years without constitutional challenge.

VllI. CONCLUSION
The status of Internet postings as printed publications under section 102
is, at best, uncertain. Applying current caselaw to the current state of the
Internet would most likely deny printed publication status to this emerging
research tool. It could be decided as a policy matter that Internet postings
should not bar patentability under section 102: the potential ocean of
information is too vast and unruly to provide the necessary likelihood of
enforceability of patents to satisfy the constitutional mandate of
encouragement for inventors. Alternatively, it could be decided that a vast,
unruly public domain furthers the policy of the patent laws.
Whether by statutory solution or private enterprise, a resolution clearly
deciding the status of Internet postings as printed publications is preferable
to allowing uncertainty to surround the principal pUblication and research
tool of the next decade. A resolution favoring printed publication status
(and therefore barring patentability of subsequent inventions) is currently
technologically feasible, at least with respect to selected categories of
Internet postings, and would be consistent with the objective of protecting
the public domain. In fairness to inventors and to protect against loss of
information in an ocean of data, the resolution should also provide for
effective storage and indexing qf postings granted printed pUblication
status.

engineering.").

